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Abstract
Hierarchical structures, transportation systems, communication networks and
even sports competitions can be modeled by means of directed graphs. Since
digraphs without a predefined game are considered, the main part of the work is
devoted to establish conditions on cooperative games so that they can be used
to measure accessibility to the nodes. Games that satisfy desirable properties
are called test games. Each ranking on the nodes is then obtained according
to a pair formed by a test game and a solution defined on cooperative games
whose utilities are given for every ordered coalition. Solutions here proposed
are extensions of the wide family of semivalues to games in generalized char-
acteristic function form.
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1. Introduction
Cooperative games with transferable utility have been proved to be appropriate mathe-
matical tools to model many situations coming from different areas of science like economy,
social sciences or political sciences. Very close to cooperative games there must always
be their solutions because, by means of these solutions, the position of each agent in the
scenario described by the game is highlighted. The information needed in any concrete
situation to define the corresponding cooperative game is the utility that each group of
agents or coalition is able to obtain. All these data are gathered in the characteristic
function.
The Shapley [19] and the Banzhaf [3, 16] values have a prominent position among
the set of solutions for cooperative games. Both of them offer to every player a unique
numerical assignment that allow to draw its importance in the game, and in both of
them the marginal contribution of the players, that is, the difference between the utility
that a coalition can obtain with or without a fixed player, are essential to determine the
assignment. Nevertheless, there is an outstanding difference between them. The Shapley
value is an efficient solution, in the sense that the sum of all the players’ assignments
coincides with the utility that the grand coalition can get, whereas the Banzhaf value is
not.
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In an economical context, or even better, in a monetary context, the efficiency is a
desirable property that enables a convenient distribution of the total utility, and it gives
to the solutions an intuitive idea easy to understand. But in other circumstances, where
efficiency is not essential, other non-efficient solution concepts can be considered. In a
broad sense, we can think in solutions that assign to each player an expected value of
their marginal contributions to the coalitions, according to probability distributions that
give a specific weight depending on the cardinality of each coalition. These solutions form
a wide family known as semivalues [6], and it contains the Banzhaf and Shapley values,
being the latter the only efficient one.
The information gathered by the characteristic function of a classical cooperative game
is the utility of all the subsets of players without considering the order in which the coalition
is formed. If the situation you want to describe depends on the order of presentation of
its agents, the concept of characteristic function must be extended to ordered coalitions.
In the literature, games defined on ordered coalitions are called games in generalized
characteristic function form. In turn, solutions for this class of games must be considered,
as Novak and Radzik [15] or Sa´nchez and Bergantin˜os [18] did, modifying in a convenient
way the Shapley value. Here, following a parallel process, we consider the extension of
semivalues to the set of cooperative games defined over ordered coalitions.
All the above mentioned concepts of Game Theory are the ones that we will use to
achieve the main purpose of this work. We want to establish mechanisms to obtain mea-
sures of the accessibility of each node in oriented networks modelled by directed graphs or,
simply, digraphs. The interest in giving a rank among the digraphs’ nodes comes from the
great amount of structures that digraphs allow to describe: hierarchy structures, compar-
ison between pairs, sports competitions, strategic assessment of nodes in communication
or transport networks, etc. There are several works in the literature that have studied this
subject. In general, the results they give depend on the fixed criteria they use to obtain
the solution. An important group of solutions are based in iterative methods, following
Wei [20] or Kendall [11]. These kind of methods were intensively analyzed by Laslier [14]
for the particular case of tournaments, that is, digraphs where for each pair of nodes there
is only one of the two possible oriented edges between them. More recently, Hering et al.
[10] provided a procedure to measure the power of the nodes in a digraph using a mixture
between the iterative and the axiomatic methods.
Concepts and methods of Game Theory have been also used to establish a rank on
the nodes of a digraph. Among others, we can remind the papers of Laffond et al. [13],
where a symmetric game of zero sum is associated to situations described as tournaments,
Gilles et al. [7] or Derks and Gilles [5] who consider games modified by structures of
hierarchy which are modelled as digraphs. In general, in these types of works, a game
is defined from the oriented structure, or the given game is modified taking into account
this structure. Our approach in this paper is different: without giving an axiomatic and
inflexible system of properties, we want to determine the features that a cooperative game
should satisfy in order to offer an acceptable ordering of the nodes of a digraph with
respect their accessibility, without any a priori game defined on the nodes of the oriented
network. The desirable features give rise to properties of the games and these are obtained
taking into account the marginal contributions of each node to the set of ordered coalitions.
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Hence, cooperative games in generalized characteristic function form are an essential tool
in our analysis.
Near cooperative games there are always their solution concepts. Desirable properties
to measure the accessibility of nodes lead to extend semivalues to games in generalized
characteristic function form. We will determine the accessibility of nodes selecting a pair
given by a game satisfying the required assumptions and a semivalue chosen following
some criteria about its coefficients, which are interpreted as a probability distribution
among the coalitions. We call test games the cooperative games that could be selected to
measure the accessibility. This terminology was already considered in Amer et al. [2] to
give a measure of the nodes in a digraph using the Shapley value. This work generalizes
the previous case and, also, widens the class of test games.
The allocations to nodes have been determined in two stages: (i) dealing with the
marginal contributions of each node, which depends on the digraph geometry and on the
utilities given by the proposed game and (ii) considering the weighting coefficients for
the ordered coalitions, which come from the chosen semivalue. In a digraph with n nodes,
stage (i) reduces to obtain marginal contributions over n−1 oriented paths (the elementary
digraphs). It is there where the properties that a game should fulfill to be considered a
test game are established. Stage (ii), strongly bond with probability distributions, allows
constructing semivalues in such a way that the weights over ordered coalitions correspond
to desired criteria.
Every pair of test game and semivalue provides a measure of the accessibility giving
an allocations vector over the nodes. In general, this allocation is not efficient. In fact,
the grand coalition’s utility does not have any special meaning in the digraph, taking into
account that the game is external to it. In order to make comparison among allocations,
in each example we use percentages vectors, in a similar way as van der Laan and van den
Brink [12] considered the so-called share functions: the allocation of each player is divided
by the sum of all the allocations (we multiply them by one hundred).
According to these considerations, the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
basic concepts about digraphs, about cooperative games, cooperative games defined over
ordered coalitions and their solutions are described. Section 3 is devoted to extending
semivalues to games in characteristic function form. The definition of accessibility of
nodes and some first properties are also given. In Section 4 the accessibility is determined
over oriented paths, giving expressions to calculate it explicitly. Section 5 relates the
concept of accessibility over oriented paths with a type of cooperative games, in such a
way that the characteristics of one game to be test game are stated. In Section 6, the
semivalue that gives appropriate weightings over ordered coalitions is chosen. A detailed
example is presented in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, a summary of the process is
presented.
2. Cooperative games modified by directed graphs
A digraph is a pair (N,D) where N is a finite set of nodes and D is a binary relation
defined on N . Each pair (i, j) ∈ N ×N corresponds to an oriented edge that links node
i to node j. Since we consider digraphs without loops, the complete digraph is (N,DN )
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with DN = N ×N \ {(i, i) / i ∈ N}. Fixed N , we identify each digraph (N,D) with the
binary relation D. In this way, all digraphs on N are the subsets D ⊆ DN .
A cooperative game with transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N, v), where N is a
finite set of players and v : 2N → R is the so-called characteristic function, which assigns
to every coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S), the worth of coalition S, and satisfies the
natural condition v(∅) = 0.
By GN we denote the set of all TU games on N . For a given set of players N , we
identify each game (N, v) with its characteristic function v. A TU game v is monotonic
if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N ; a TU game v is called symmetric if the utilities
only depend on the coaliton size, i.e., v(S) = f(s), where s = |S|, and a TU game v is
zero-normalized when v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
When the utilities also depend on the orders of the players within each coalition,
we need to consider TU games in generalized characteristic function form as they were
introduced by Nowak and Radzik in [15] and by Sanchez and Bergantin˜os in [18]. Formally,
for each nonempty subset S ⊆ N , we denote by H(S) the set of all orders of the elements
in S. The elements T ∈ H(S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, will be called ordered coalitions. A TU
game in generalized characteristic function form or, for short, a generalized TU game is
a pair (N, v) where N is a finite set of players and v is a function that assigns to every
T ∈ H(S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, a real number v(T ). By definition H(∅) = {∅} and v(∅) = 0 is
imposed. We denote the set of all generalized TU games on N by ΓN .
For a nonempty ordered coalition T = (i1, i2, . . . , is) ∈ H(S), we say that ij+1 is the
consecutive element of ij in T , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s − 1 (or ij is the previous element of ij+1).
A subset of consecutive elements in T , Q = (ip, ip+1, . . . , ip+u) with 1 ≤ p ≤ p + u ≤ s, is
called a consecutive subcoalition of T .
Definition 2.1. Given a digraph D defined on N , a consecutive subcoalition Q = (ip, ip+1,
. . . , ip+u) of T = (i1, i2, . . . , is) is a connected consecutive subcoalition according to the
digraph D if, and only if, u = 0 or (ij , ij+1) ∈ D for j = p, . . . , p+ u− 1.
If, in addition, (i) p = 1 or (ip−1, ip) 6∈ D and (ii) p+u = s or (ip+u, ip+u+1) 6∈ D, we say
that Q is a maximal connected consecutive subcoalition according to D.
Definition 2.2. Let v and D be a TU game and a digraph respectively defined on N . The
game v modified by digraph D is the generalized TU game defined by
vD(T ) =
∑
Q∈T/D
v(Q′) ∀T ∈ H(S), ∀S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅,
where T/D denotes the set of maximal connected consecutive subcoalitions of T according
to digraph D, and Q′ denotes the (non-ordered) coalition in N formed with the elements
of the ordered subcoalition Q.
Remark 2.3. If v is a symmetric TU game, for every modified game vD, the utilities
of all ordered coalitions only depend on the size of their respective maximal connected
consecutive subcoalitions according to digraph D: v(Q′) = f(q), where q = |Q′|. From now
on, we only consider symmetric TU games.
Example 2.4. We introduce three symmetric TU games whose utilities are obtained from
specific properties of the coalitions related with their respective sizes.
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(i) The conferences game. For every coalition S ⊆ N , the conferences game assigns
the number of subcoalitions in S with two or more players ( conferences): v1(S) =
f1(s) = 2
s − s− 1, ∀S ⊆ N .
(ii) The pairs game. For every coalition S ⊆ N , the pairs game assigns the number of
subcoalitions in S with two players: v2(S) = f2(s) = s(s− 1)/2, ∀S ⊆ N .
(iii) The lengths game. For every coalition S ⊆ N , the lengths game assigns the length
of a minimal path involving all players as nodes: v3(S) = f3(s) = s− 1, ∀S ⊆ N .
Game v1 and game 2v2 –under the name of messages game– were considered in [9], where
social networks without direction have been studied. All three games are zero-normalized.
A solution or a value on the set of TU games GN is a function Ψ : GN → R
N which
assigns to every game v a vector Ψ[v] with components Ψi[v] for all i ∈ N . It represents a
method to measure the negotiation strength of the players in the game. The vector space
R
N is called the allocation space. Semivalues [6] as solution concepts were introduced
by Dubey, Neyman and Weber by means of four axioms. A solution ψ : GN → R
N is a
semivalue iff it satisfies the following properties:
A1. Linearity. ψ[λu+ µv] = λψ[u] + µψ[v] for all u, v ∈ GN and λ, µ ∈ R.
A2. Anonymity. ψpii[piv] = ψi[v] for all v ∈ GN , i ∈ N and pi permutation of N , where
game piv is defined by (piv)(piS) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
A3. Positivity. If game v is monotonic, then ψi[v] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
A4. Projection. ψi[v] = v({i}) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ AN , where AN denotes the set of
additive games in GN , i.e., games v such that v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) if S ∩ T = ∅
and S, T ⊆ N.
In the same paper, another characterization of semivalues by using weighting coefficients
and marginal contributions is provided.
Theorem 2.5. (Dubey et al., [6]) (a) For every weighting vector (ps)
n
s=1 such that
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
ps = 1 and ps ≥ 0 for s = 1, . . . , n, (1)
the expression
ψi[v] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps+1[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN , (2)
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ψ on GN .
(b) Conversely, every semivalue on GN is of this form, i.e., there exists a one-to-one map
between the semivalues on GN and the vectors (ps)
n
s=1 verifying conditions (1).
The marginal contribution of a player i ∈ N to a coalition S ∪ {i}, with S ⊆ N \ {i},
is the difference v(S ∪{i})− v(S). Expression (2) shows that the allocation to each player
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by a semivalue ψ on GN is an average of the marginal contributions to the coalitions to
which it belongs, where the weighting coefficients ps+1 only depend on the coalition size.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value φ [19], for which ps =
[n
(n−1
s−1
)
]−1, and the Banzhaf value β [3, 16], for which ps = 2
1−n. The Shapley value φ is
the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that
∑
i∈N φi[v] = v(N) for every v ∈ GN . It is
worthy of mention that these two classical values are defined for each N .
Also, a parametric family of semivalues can be considered for each N . Given a real
number α ∈ (0, 1), the binomial semivalue ψα [17, 8] is defined on the set of TU games
GN by its weighting coefficients: pα,s = α
s−1(1 − α)n−s for s = 1, . . . , n. It is the unique
family of semivalues whose weights are in geometric progression: pα,s+1/pα,s = α/(1−α),
s = 1, . . . , n − 1. In addition, n different binomial semivalues form a reference system on
the set of all semivalues on GN [1], so that, every semivalue can be written as a linear
combination of them. The Banzhaf value is the binomial semivalue for α = 1/2.
3. Extended semivalues and directed graphs
The solutions for TU games provided by the wide family of semivalues on GN can be
extended to solutions for generalized TU games in a same way as the classical Shapley
value were extended by Nowak and Radzik in [15] for all games in ΓN .
Definition 3.1. Let ψ be a semivalue defined on GN with weighting vector (ps)
n
s=1. The
extension on the set of generalized TU games ΓN of semivalue ψ is the allocation rule
defined by
ψi[v] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps+1
s!
∑
T∈H(S)
[v((T, i)) − v(T )] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ ΓN , (3)
where (T, i) is the ordered coalition obtained from T adding element i at its end.
Remark 3.2. By abuse of notation, we use the same letter ψ for the extended semivalue
on ΓN . It is clear that every extended semivalue ψ satisfies similar properties to A1–A4
but in the context of generalized TU games.
A1’. Linearity. ψ[λu+ µv] = λψ[u] + µψ[v] for all u, v ∈ ΓN and λ, µ ∈ R.
A2’. Anonymity. ψpii[piv] = ψi[v] for all v ∈ ΓN , i ∈ N and pi permutation of N , where
game piv is defined by (piv)(piT ) = v(T ) for all T ∈ H(S) and S ⊆ N .
A3’. Positivity. We call a game v ∈ ΓN monotonic if v((T1, T2)) ≥ v(T1), for all T1 ∈
H(S1), T2 ∈ H(S2) and S2 ⊆ N \ S1. If game v ∈ ΓN is monotonic, then ψi[v] ≥ 0
for all i ∈ N .
A4’. Projection. ψi[v] = v({i}) for all i ∈ N and v ∈ AN , where AN denotes the set
of additive games in ΓN , i.e., games v such that v((T1, T2)) = v(T1) + v(T2) for all
T1 ∈ H(S1) and T2 ∈ H(S2), if S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and S1, S2 ⊆ N.
According to property A2, when a symmetric TU game is defined on a set N , the
allocations to all players provided by each semivalue on GN are coincident. Given a
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digraph D with set of nodes N , a symmetric TU game v is modified in a generalized TU
game vD where, in general, vD(T1) 6= v
D(T2) for T1, T2 ∈ H(S) and S ⊆ N . Then, the
allocations to the nodes of N as players in game vD according to an extended semivalue
are, in general, not coincident.
The allocation to each node through a symmetric TU game v modified by a digraph D
depends on the geometry of the connections described by the modified game vD and, also,
on the amounts that weigh to the marginal contributions of each node; these amounts
are related with the weighting vector of each semivalue. Both characteristics –geometry
and weights– allow us to introduce several rankings among the nodes of digraphs as we
establish in the following definition.
Definition 3.3. Let v be a symmetric TU game defined on N and let ψ be a semivalue
defined on GN with weighting vector (ps)
n
s=1. Given a digraph D with set of nodes N ,
we call accessibility of node i ∈ N according to game v and semivalue ψ to the allocation
obtained by player i in the modified game vD according to the extended semivalue ψ defined
on ΓN :
ai[D; v, ψ] := ψi[v
D] =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps+1
s!
∑
T∈H(S)
[vD((T, i)) − vD(T )] for all i ∈ N . (4)
Example 3.4. On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3}, given the digraph defined by D =
{(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}, the modified game obtained from the symmetric TU game
v1 introduced in Example 2.4 is defined as follows:
vD1 (i) = 0 ∀i ∈ N, v
D
1 (1, 3) = 0, v
D
1 (i, j) = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ D, v
D
1 (1, 3, 2) = v
D
1 (2, 1, 3) = 1
and vD1 (i, j, k) = 4 ∀(i, j, k) ∈ H(N), (i, j, k) 6= (1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3).
In turn, according to digraph D, the modified games of games v2 and v3 in Example
2.4 take the same values as game vD1 except:
vD2 (i, j, k) = 3, v
D
3 (i, j, k) = 2 ∀(i, j, k) ∈ H(N), (i, j, k) 6= (1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3).
Independently of the above games, we can consider several semivalues on three-player
games. For instance: the Shapley value φ with weighting vector (p1, p2, p3) = (1/3, 1/6, 1/3),
the Banzhaf value β with weights ps = 1/4 , s=1, 2, 3, the binomial semivalue ψ1/3 whose
weighting vector is (p1, p2, p3) = (4/9, 2/9, 1/9) and, the binomial semivalue ψ2/3 with
(p1, p2, p3) = (1/9, 2/9, 4/9).
Table 1 shows some allocations to the nodes according to the corresponding extended
semivalues and the modified games. A column offers the allocation and another column
presents the percentage vector for comparison.
Several properties of the accessibility for specific selected games and all semivalues are
described in the next proposition. A node i in a digraph D is called inaccessible if no
other node j ∈ N can be found such that (j, i) ∈ D. As it seems reasonable, we will
propose conditions so that the accessibility of an inaccessible node takes null value, or the
accessibility of a node does not decrease when an edge arriving to the considered node is
added.
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ψ[vD] (ψ1[v
D], ψ2[v
D], ψ3[v
D]) %
φ[vD1 ] ( 4/3, 1, 2/3 ) ( 44.44, 33.33, 22.22 )
φ[vD2 ] ( 1, 5/6, 1/2 ) ( 42.86, 35.71, 21.43 )
β[vD1 ] ( 5/4, 1, 5/8 ) ( 43.48, 34.78, 21.74 )
β[vD2 ] ( 1, 7/8, 1/2 ) ( 42.11, 36.84, 21.05 )
β[vD3 ] ( 3/4, 3/4, 3/8 ) ( 40.00, 40.00, 20.00 )
ψ1/3[v
D
1 ] ( 28/9, 20/9, 14/9 ) ( 45.16, 32.26, 22.58 )
ψ2/3[v
D
2 ] ( 4/3, 10/9, 2/3 ) ( 42.86, 35.71, 21.43 )
Table 1: Values of accessibility of the nodes in digraph D
Proposition 3.5. Let D be a digraph defined on a finite set N (D ⊆ DN). For every
semivalue ψ defined on GN :
(i) if v ∈ GN is a zero-normalized TU game and i ∈ N is an inaccessible node in D,
then ai[D; v, ψ] = 0;
(ii) if an edge leaving a node i is added, then ai[D ∪ (i, j); v, ψ] = ai[D; v, ψ], for every
TU game v ∈ GN ;
(iii) if v ∈ GN is a monotonic and zero-normalized TU game, and an edge arriving to a
node i is added, then ai[D ∪ (j, i); v, ψ] ≥ ai[D; v, ψ];
(iv) the accessibility in the complete digraph DN equals the payoff by the selected semi-
value: ai[DN ; v, ψ] = ψi[v] for all i ∈ N , for every TU game v ∈ GN .
Remark 3.6. (a) From (iii), in addition to the condition of zero-normalized, regular semi-
values (weighting coefficients ps > 0 for s = 1, . . . , n) and strictly monotonic TU games
(v(S) < v(T ) whenever S ⊂ T ⊆ N) guarantee an increase of the accessibility for node i
when a new edge (j, i) is added.
(b) According to (iv), given a semivalue ψ acting on the set of TU games GN , the concept
of accessibility in a digraph offers an extension of the concept of solution defined by the
considered semivalue.
(c) All statements in the above Proposition have been proved using the marginal contribu-
tions of each node to the ordered coalitions. This procedure allows us to differentiate the
contribution of the modified game vD to the accessibility with respect to the contribution
due to the selected semivalue ψ. Now, we will generalize this work method.
Definition 3.7. Let v be a TU game defined on a finite set N and let D be a digraph with
set of nodes N . The vector of marginal contributions for a node i ∈ N according to game
v modified by digraph D is
mi(v
D) = (mi,1(v
D),mi,2(v
D), . . . ,mi,n(v
D))
where each component is defined by
mi,s(v
D) =
∑
S′⊆N\{i}:|S′|=s−1
∑
T∈H(S′)
[vD((T, i)) − vD(T )] for s = 1, . . . , n. (5)
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Expression of accessibility (4) for each node i ∈ N in a digraph D ⊆ DN can be
rewritten in the following way:
ai[D; v, ψ] = ψi[v
D] =
n∑
s=1
ps
(s− 1)!
∑
S′⊆N\{i}:|S′|=s−1
∑
T∈H(S′)
[vD((T, i)) − vD(T )]. (6)
On the other hand, from the weighting vector (ps)
n
s=1 of a semivalue ψ defined on
GN , we can define the weighting vector of the extended semivalue ψ defined on the set of
generalized games ΓN by
ω(ψ) =
(
p1
0!
,
p2
1!
, . . . ,
pn
(n− 1)!
)
(7)
and then, the accessibility for node i in digraph D can be expressed as a scalar product:
ai[D; v, ψ] = ω(ψ) · mi(v
D). (8)
The contribution of semivalue ψ to the accessibility of node i is collected by the weight-
ing vector ω(ψ), whereas vector mi(v
D) summarizes both geometry of digraph D and
marginal contributions of node i according to game v.
4. Accessibility decomposition
In this section we want to offer a systematic procedure of computation for the accessi-
bility of the nodes in directed graphs based on the calculus over oriented paths, considered
as elementary digraphs.
On a set of nodes N , a digraph P included in DN is called an oriented path if
P = {(i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (im−1, im)} with i1, i2, . . . , im ∈ N and ij 6= ik if j 6= k.
For short, we denote it by Pi1i2...im−1im.
Definition 4.1. Given a digraph D ⊆ DN and a node i ∈ N , we define digraph Di ] as
the union of all maximal oriented paths contained in D with last element node i.
Example 4.2. On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, given the digraph defined by D =
{(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)}, we have:
D1 ] = P241 ∪ P2341 D2 ] = P3412 ∪ P1342
D3 ] = P2413 ∪ P4123 ∪ P423 D4 ] = P124 ∪ P134 ∪ P1234
Lemma 4.3. Let D be a digraph defined on the set of nodes N and let v be a TU game
defined on N . For the marginal contributions it is verified:
(i) mi(v
D) = mi(v
Di ]) for all i ∈ N ,
(ii) for every pair of paths P and P ′ with a same last node i,
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(a) if P ∩ P ′ does not have any connected component containing node i, then
mi(v
P∪P ′) = mi(v
P ) +mi(v
P ′)
(b) if P ∩ P ′ has one connected component containing node i, (P ∩ P ′)i, then
mi(v
P∪P ′) = mi(v
P ) +mi(v
P ′)−mi(v
(P∩P ′)i).
The above Lemma shows that the marginal contributions of all nodes can be reduced
to marginal contributions of last nodes in oriented paths. In this way, by symmetry
property, given a digraph defined on a set N with n nodes, it suffices to know n−1 vectors
of marginal contributions for each symmetric TU game v modified by oriented paths:
m1(v
Pn...1), m1(v
Pn−1...1), . . . , m1(v
P21).
For simplicity of notation, we have chosen node 1 as last node in all oriented paths. The
next propositions offer explicit expressions for these vectors of marginal contributions.
Proposition 4.4. Let v be a symmetric and zero-normalized TU game defined on N , i.e.,
v(S) = f(s) ∀S ⊆ N (s = |S|) and f(1) = 0. If Pn...1 is an oriented path joining all nodes
in N , then the marginal contributions of node 1 in game v modified by Pn...1 are given by
m1,1(v
Pn...1) = 0; m1,2(v
Pn...1) = f(2);
m1,k(v
Pn...1) = f(k)− f(k − 1) +
k−1∑
j=2
(n− j − 1)Vn−j−1,k−j−1[f(j)− f(j − 1)],
(9)
for k = 3, . . . , n − 1, and
m1,n(v
Pn...1) = f(n)− f(n− 1) +
n−2∑
j=2
(n− j − 1)(n − j − 1)![f(j) − f(j − 1)].
Proposition 4.5. Let v be a symmetric and zero-normalized TU game as defined in
Proposition 4.4. If Pq...1 is an oriented path involving some nodes in N (2 ≤ q < n), then
the marginal contributions of node 1 in game v modified by Pq...1 are given by
m1,k(v
Pq...1) = m1,k(v
Pn...1), for k = 1, . . . , q;
m1,k(v
Pq...1) =
q−1∑
j=2
(n− j − 1)Vn−j−1,k−j−1[f(j)− f(j − 1)]+
+ Vn−q,k−q[f(q)− f(q − 1)], for k = q + 1, . . . , n− 1,
(10)
and m1,n(v
Pq...1) = m1,n−1(v
Pq...1).
Example 4.6. On the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4} we introduce the conferences game
defined by v(S) = f(s) = 2s−s−1 ∀S ⊆ N . In order to obtain all vectors of marginal con-
tributions for this game v modified by any digraph defined on N , three vectors of marginal
contributions are needed:
m1(v
P4321) = (0, 1, 4, 8), m1(v
P321) = (0, 1, 4, 4) and m1(v
P21) = (0, 1, 2, 2).
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We now consider digraph D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)} ⊆ DN and,
for each node in N , we determine its vector of marginal contributions for game v modified
by D.
For node 1, because D1 ] = P2341 ∪ P241, we have:
m1(v
D) = m1(v
D1 ]) = m1(v
P2341) +m1(v
P241)−m1(v
P41)
= (0, 1, 4, 8) + (0, 1, 4, 4) − (0, 1, 2, 2) = (0, 1, 6, 10).
Similar computations follow for the remaining nodes:
m2(v
D) = m2(v
D2 ]) = m2(v
P1342) +m2(v
P3412) = (0, 2, 8, 16);
m3(v
D) = m3(v
D3 ]) = m3(v
P2413) +m3(v
P4123) +m3(v
P423)−m3(v
P23) = (0, 2, 10, 18);
m4(v
D) = m4(v
D4 ]) = m4(v
P1234) +m4(v
P134)−m4(v
P34) +m4(v
P124) = (0, 2, 10, 14).
Remark 4.7. Expressions in Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 allow us to know the marginal
contributions for the last node according to symmetric TU games modified by oriented
paths. From property (i) in Lemma 4.3, the marginal contributions of intermediate nodes
can be reduced to marginal contributions of last nodes:
mik(v
Pi1...ik...im ) = mik(v
(Pi1...ik...im )ik ]) = mik(v
Pi1...ik ).
Remark 4.8. We want now to pay attention, for instance, to the unions of oriented paths
D3 ] and D4 ] in Example 4.2: D3 ] = P2413 ∪ P4123 ∪ P423 and D4 ] = P124 ∪ P134 ∪ P1234.
Colloquially speaking, the structure of D3 ] can be obtained from the structure of D4 ],
replacing an oriented path with 3 nodes –P124– by an oriented path with 4 nodes –P2413–.
More precisely, let pi be a permutation of N . Given a digraph D with edges (i, j)
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, the digraph D transformed by pi is pi(D), whose edges are (pi(i), pi(j)) for
all (i, j) belonging to D. Digraphs D and pi(D) are isomorphic: they only differ on the
label of their respective nodes. According to the above consideration, it is easy to see that
there exists a permutation pi defined on N so that D3 ] ⊃ pi(D4 ]).
The above comparison can be extended to all pairs of distinct unions of oriented paths
Di ], i = 1, 2, 3, 4, in Example 4.2. We have,
D3 ] ⊃ pi(D2 ]), D3 ] ⊃ pi(D1 ]) and D4 ] ⊃ pi(D1 ]),
where it is understood that each permutation pi is adequate to the studied comparison. This
remark leads us to the following definition.
Definition 4.9. Let D be a digraph with set of nodes N . Node i is structurally more
accessible than node j in digraph D ⊆ DN iff there exists a permutation pi of N with
pi(j) = i so that Di ] ⊃ pi(Dj ]).
From now on, we will use this notation: given two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and b =
(b1, . . . , bn) belonging to R
n, we will say that a ≥ b iff ai ≥ bi ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 4.10. Let D be a digraph defined on a finite set N (D ⊆ DN ). For every
symmetric and monotonic TU game v ∈ GN , if node i is structurally more accessible than
node j in digraph D, then ai[D; v, ψ] ≥ aj[D; v, ψ] for every semivalue ψ defined on GN .
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Note that inclusion Di ] ⊃ pi(Dj ]) in Definition 4.9 is strict. In case of equality, Di ] =
pi(Dj ]), with pi permutation of N , we can say that nodes i and j are equally accessible and
their respective accessibilities coincide for all semivalues on GN .
According to the result obtained in the previous Proposition, it seems that nothing
depends on the game and the semivalue selected to measure accessibility. On the contrary,
a more larger structural accessibility of a node with respect to other node always results in
a greater measure of accessibility, as it seems reasonable. The introduction of games and
semivalues will allow the modification of the relationship between measures of accessibility,
without changing the structural dominance of a node over another. However, not all pairs
of nodes will be comparable according to the relation structurally more accessible than.
5. Oriented paths and convexity
Definition 5.1. A cooperative TU game v on N is said to be convex if v(S1 ∪ S2) ≥
v(S1) + v(S2)− v(S1 ∩ S2) ∀S1, S2 ⊆ N .
Lemma 5.2. Let v be a symmetric TU game defined on N , v(S) = f(s) ∀S ⊆ N with
s = |S|. Convexity for symmetric game v is equivalent to conditions
f(s)− f(s− 1) ≥ f(s− 1)− f(s− 2), 2 ≤ s ≤ n = |N |. (11)
In a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where a symmetric and zero-normalized TU game v is
defined, we want to compare the marginal contributions of a given node when an edge
is added to an oriented path. To do so, we consider oriented paths Pq...1 and Pq+1...1 for
2 ≤ q ≤ n− 1 and we focus on node 1. According to Proposition 4.5:
m1,k(v
Pq...1) = m1,k(v
Pq+1...1) = m1,k(v
Pn...1), k = 1, . . . , q.
The following proposition shows a relationship between the remaining marginal contribu-
tions and the convexity of game v.
Proposition 5.3. Let v be a symmetric, monotonic and zero-normalized TU game on N .
For all oriented paths Pq...1, 2 ≤ q ≤ n− 1, involving some nodes in N ,
m1,k(v
Pq...1) ≤ m1,k(v
Pq+1...1), ∀k = q + 1, . . . , n ⇔ v is a convex game.
According to this last Proposition and its previous comment, Eq. (8) allows us to
formulate the following result.
Theorem 5.4. For every symmetric, monotonic and zero-normalized TU game defined
on N and every semivalue defined on GN , by adjunction of previous nodes to oriented
paths on N , the accessibility of their last nodes does not decrease if and only if the selected
TU game is convex.
In the previous statement, all inequalities can be replaced by strict inequalities. Con-
vexity can be replaced by strict convexity, f(s) − f(s − 1) > f(s − 1) − f(s − 2),
2 ≤ s ≤ n = |N | and we can only consider regular semivalues (weighting coefficients
ps > 0, 1 ≤ s ≤ n). Under these conditions, an increase of accessibility of the last nodes
in oriented paths by adjunction of previous nodes is equivalent to strict convexity of the
TU game.
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Remark 5.5. From the beginning, to define accessibility of nodes in digraphs, we have
considered symmetric TU games, with the aim that the allocations depend on the geometry
of the oriented network and they are not dependent on the label of each node.
Other desired properties are satisfied asking some characteristics on the considered
TU games. For instance, (i) null accessibility for inaccessible nodes is obtained by zero-
normalized property of the game, (ii) no negative (positive) accessibility for the remaining
nodes, by (strict) monotonicity, (iii) not decrease (increase) of accessibility for a node
when an edge arriving to this node is added, also by (strict) monotonicity.
Now, it seems interesting to obtain an increase of accessibility of the last nodes in
oriented paths by adjunction of previous nodes, so that the strict convexity of the selected
games is also demanded.
All these required properties can be summarized for the symmetric games v ∈ GN
defined by means of v(S) = f(s) ∀S ⊆ N according to three conditions:
f(1) = 0; f(2) > 0; f(s)− f(s− 1) > f(s− 1)− f(s− 2), 3 ≤ s ≤ n. (12)
Example 5.6. Example 2.4 revisited. The conferences game and the pairs game respec-
tively defined by v1(S) = f1(s) = 2
s − s − 1 and v2(S) = f2(s) = s(s − 1)/2 are strictly
convex games. Nevertheless, the lengths game v3(S) = f3(s) = s− 1 as linear game is not
strictly convex. In particular, this last game is the unique linear game verifying condition
of zero-normalized, except a multiplicative constant. According to the previous remark,
the two first games are convenient to compute weighted accessibility of nodes in oriented
graphs.
Lemma 5.7. Let v ∈ GN be a symmetric, zero-normalized and linear TU game. Then,
the vector of marginal contributions of the last node in game v modified by any oriented
path does not depend on the considered path.
Example 5.8. We consider D = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 2)} ⊆ DN as
defined in Example 4.6, with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, but we now consider the lengths game v(S) =
f3(s) = s − 1 for s = 1, . . . , 4. All vectors of marginal contributions we need to compute
accessibility of any node in D are coincident: m1(v
P4321) = m1(v
P321) = m1(v
P21) =
(0, 1, V2,1, V2,2) = (0, 1, 2, 4).
As we have worked in Example 4.6, the vectors of marginal contributions for each node
in D can be computed from the above vectors:
m1(v
D) = (0, 1, 2, 4) and mj(v
D) = (0, 2, 4, 8) for j = 2, 3, 4.
The vector of marginal contributions of each node is a multiple of vector (0, 1, 2, 4) and
the factor exactly coincides with the number of edges arriving at the considered node. This
way, given ψ any semivalue defined on four-player games by means of its weighting vector
(p1, p2, p3, p4), we compute the accessibility of the nodes in oriented graph D according to
Eq. (8):
a1[D; v, ψ] = p2 + p3 +
2
3
p4; aj [D; v, ψ] = 2p2 + 2p3 +
4
3
p4, j = 2, 3, 4.
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The percentage vector of accessibility (14.29, 28.57, 28.57, 28.57) does not depend on the
selected semivalue and its information is only taken of the number of edges arriving at
each node.
The above example can be easily generalized to every digraph and every linear game,
where linear is employed as a synonym of a multiple of the lengths game defined by
f3(s) = s−1. If we choose as test game a linear game, the action of the selected semivalue
to compute accessibility is disabled. The families of test games we propose do not contain
linear games; they are introduced in the next definition.
Definition 5.9. Let GN be the set of TU games with n players. We consider as test
games to compute accessibility in digraphs with n nodes two families of symmetric games:
(i) games of monomial type, vr(S) = fr(s) = s
r − 1, ∀S ⊆ N with r > 1;
(ii) games of exponential type, vr(S) = fr(s) = r
s−1 − 1, ∀S ⊆ N with r > 1.
Each one of the games belonging to these families satisfies conditions (12) and it can be
used as test game; also, every convex linear combination of them can be employed. Note
that games v2(S) = f2(s) = s
2−1 and v2(S) = f2(s) = 2
s−1−1 are quite close to the pairs
game v2(S) = f2(s) = s(s − 1)/2 and the conferences game v1(S) = f1(s) = 2
s − s − 1,
respectively. In both cases, the linear component has been deleted.
6. Choosing semivalues
So far we have focused our attention on the cooperative games suggested to determine
the accessibility of the nodes in a digraph. We will now pay attention on the semivalues
involved according to its weighting coefficients. Given a semivalue ψ defined on the set GN
of TU games with n players, each coefficient ps weighs marginal contributions to coalitions
of size s, for s = 1 to s = n. To compute accessibility, we have extended each semivalue
to the generalized games in ΓN . The marginal contributions to ordered coalitions of size
s are now weighted according to coefficients ps/(s− 1)!, as we have stated in Eq. (6).
Our purpose consists of choosing the coefficients of a semivalue defined on the set GN
of classic TU games so that the corresponding extended semivalue on ΓN has a suitable
distribution of weights on the ordered coalitions. That is, choosing in an appropriate way
coefficients ps, so that ps/(s − 1)! respond to our claims. For instance, we suppose that,
emulating to the Banzhaf value on classic TU games, we want to weigh every marginal
contribution to the ordered coalitions with a same coefficient. In the following Definition,
we introduce such a semivalue; before, a Lemma is needed.
Lemma 6.1. The number of nonempty ordered coalitions in a set N is given by
|{T ∈ H(S) | ∅ 6= S ⊆ N}| = ⌊e n!⌋ − 1, for |N | = n ≥ 2,
where ⌊x⌋ denotes the integer part of a positive number x.
Definition 6.2. On the set GN of TU games with n players, we define the semivalue β˜
“emulating to the Banzhaf value” by means of its weighting coefficients:
p˜s =
(s− 1)!
⌊e (n − 1)!⌋
for s = 1, . . . , n.
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It is not difficult to check that the above coefficients p˜s satisfy conditions (1), so
that β˜ belongs to the set of semivalues on GN . When this semivalue is extended to
generalized cooperative games in ΓN , all coefficients weighting each marginal contribution
to all ordered coalitions are coincident: ps/(s−1)! = ps′/(s
′−1)! for all 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ n. The
extended semivalue of β˜ plays on ΓN a similar role to the Banzhaf value β on the classic
cooperative games of GN . This motivates its definition.
The above procedure for the Banzhaf value can be extended to every semivalue ψ on
GN , as we stated in the next Definition.
Definition 6.3. Let ψ be a semivalue on GN with weighting vector (ps)
n
s=1. We define
the semivalue ψ˜ “emulating to the semivalue ψ” by means of its weighting coefficients:
p˜s =
1
(n− 1)!
∑n
s=1 ps/(n − s)!
(s− 1)!ps for s = 1, . . . , n.
After some computations, one can see that coefficients p˜s also satisfy conditions (1)
characterizing semivalues on GN . In addition, ps′ p˜s/(s − 1)! = ps p˜s′/(s
′ − 1)! for all
1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ n. This guarantees that the proportion between the coefficients weighting
ordered coalitions of sizes s and s′ according to the extended semivalue of ψ˜ on games
in ΓN equals the proportion between the coefficients weighting non-ordered coalitions of
sizes s and s′ according to semivalue ψ defined on GN .
7. A detailed example
Below, a detailed study of accessibility in a concrete example is offered. After the
introduction of the digraph, several steps follow: (i) decomposition as union of all maximal
oriented paths with a same last node; (ii) selection of some test games and determination
of the corresponding vector of marginal contributions for each node; (iii) introduction of
several semivalues according to suitable distributions of weights on the ordered coalitions
and computation of accessibility in several cases and (iv) comments on the obtained results.
A competition digraph. A set of teams playing in a sports competition produces a
series of dominance relations based on the result of each match. It seems thus natural that
all obtained results are collected in a dominance digraph, so-called competition digraph
D. We want to focus our attention in the tournaments, where each match has a winner
and a loser. Here, the relation of dominance can be clearly translated in an oriented edge:
if player j wins the match it played against i then, (i, j) ∈ D. Nevertheless, this definition
of competition digraph is not unique; one can see a more general definition in Van den
Brink and Borm [4], precisely in the case in which a draw can be a possible outcome of
the match.
Basketball competitions are played in tournaments. The example we present is ob-
tained at the European Basketball Championship (EuroBasket 2009), where, in the Qual-
ifying Round, group F consisted of six players: Slovenia (1), Turkey (2), Serbia (3), Spain
(4), Poland (5) and Lithuania (6). The relation of results of the 15 matches is: 1 wins to
2, 3, 5 and 6, 2 wins to 3, 4, 5, and 6, 3 wins to 4, 5 and 6, 4 wins to 1, 5 and 6, and
5 wins to 6. Fiba Europe (Erobasket 2009 Organizer) ranks the teams with 2 points for
a win and 1 point for a loss. According to this system, vector (9, 9, 8, 8, 6, 5) collects the
official allocation to the teams of group F.
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Now, this situation arising from a sports competition will be analyzed applying our
accessibility measures. We first consider on the set of teams N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} the
competition digraph as it has been defined above:
D = {(1, 4), (2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2), (4, 3), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (6, 1), (6, 2),
(6, 3), (6, 4), (6, 5)}
(i) For each team i ∈ N , the unions of maximal oriented paths Di ] are:
D1 ] =P654321 ∪ P64321 ∪ P65321 ∪ P6321 ∪ P65421 ∪ P6421 ∪ P6521 ∪ P621 ∪ P65431∪
P6431 ∪ P6531 ∪ P631 ∪ P651 ∪ P61,
D2 ] =P651432 ∪ P61432 ∪ P65432 ∪ P6432 ∪ P6532 ∪ P632 ∪ P653142 ∪ P63142 ∪ P65142∪
P6142 ∪ P6542 ∪ P642 ∪ P652 ∪ P62,
D3 ] = P652143 ∪ P62143 ∪ P65143 ∪ P6143 ∪ P6543 ∪ P643 ∪ P653 ∪ P63,
D4 ] = P653214 ∪ P63214 ∪ P65214 ∪ P6214 ∪ P65314 ∪ P6314 ∪ P6514 ∪ P614 ∪ P654 ∪ P64,
D5 ] = P65 and D6 ] = ∅.
(ii) We now introduce two test games and compute the vectors of marginal contribu-
tions for the last node in oriented paths. For test game v2(S) = f2(s) = s
2 − 1:
m1(v
P6...1
2 ) = (0, 3, 14, 44, 90, 92), m1(v
P5...1
2 ) = (0, 3, 14, 44, 90, 90),
m1(v
P4...1
2 ) = (0, 3, 14, 44, 88, 88), m1(v
P321
2 ) = (0, 3, 14, 42, 84, 84)
and m1(v
P21
2 ) = (0, 3, 12, 36, 72, 72).
With these five vectors, all vectors of marginal contributions for the nodes in D can
be obtained. For node 1:
m1(v
D
2 ) = m1(v
D1 ]
2 ) = m1(v
P6...1
2 ) + 4m1(v
P5...1
2 ) + 4m1(v
P4...1
2 )−m1(v
P321
2 )− 4m1(v
P21
2 )
= (0, 12, 64, 210, 430, 432).
Similar computations lead us to the vectors for the remaining nodes.
m2(v
D
2 ) = (0, 12, 62, 202, 416, 420), m3(v
D
2 ) = (0, 9, 44, 140, 286, 288),
m4(v
D
2 ) = (0, 12, 58, 186, 380, 382), m5(v
D
2 ) = (0, 3, 12, 36, 72, 72)
and m6(v
D
2 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
We repeat the same procedure for test game v2(S) = f2(s) = 2
s−1 − 1.
m1(v
P6...1
2
) = (0, 1, 5, 17, 38, 46), m1(v
P5...1
2
) = (0, 1, 5, 17, 38, 38),
m1(v
P4...1
2
) = (0, 1, 5, 17, 34, 34), m1(v
P321
2
) = (0, 1, 5, 15, 30, 30)
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and m1(v
P21
2
) = (0, 1, 4, 12, 24, 24).
From the above vectors,
m1(v
D
2
) = (0, 4, 24, 90, 200, 208), m2(v
D
2
) = (0, 4, 23, 85, 194, 210),
m3(v
D
2
) = (0, 3, 16, 56, 124, 132), m4(v
D
2
) = (0, 3, 17, 63, 142, 150),
m5(v
D
2
) = (0, 1, 4, 12, 24, 24) and m6(v
D
2
) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
(iii) At this stage, we shall now proceed to choose semivalues. The first selected
semivalue will be β˜ which emulates the Banzahf value. In games with six players, ⌊e 5!⌋ =
326 so the weighting coefficients of β˜ take values ps = (s−1)!/326 for s = 1, . . . , 6 and the
unique weighting coefficient of the extended semivalue on games with ordered coalitions
is 1/326.
The second selected semivalue is ψ˜1/3, who emulates the binomial semivalue ψ1/3.
Weighting vector of ψ1/3:
(ps)
6
s=1 = (32/243, 16/243, 8/243, 4/243, 2/243, 1/243).
Weighting vector of semivalue ψ˜1/3, obtained according to Definition 6.3:
(p˜s)
6
s=1 = (32/872, 16/872, 16/872, 24/872, 48/872, 120/872).
Weighting vector of the extended semivalue ψ˜ defined on generalized games of ΓN :
ω(ψ˜1/3) =
1
872
(32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1) .
For this competition digraph, we offer four measures of accessibility for the six nodes
as rankings of the teams they represent. Table 2 shows the solution vectors computed
from test games v2 and v2 and semivalues β˜ and ψ˜1/3. At its end, two rows have been
added: the first one contains the classical solution obtained by the eigenvector method,
while the second one shows the official allocation given by Fiba Europe.
solution vector
a[D; v2, β˜] ( 3.5215, 3.4110, 2.3528, 3.1227, 0.5982, 0.0000 )
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] ( 3.2523, 3.1514, 2.1972, 2.9151, 0.5780, 0.0000 )
a[D; v2, β˜] ( 1.6135, 1.5828, 1.0153, 1.1503, 0.1994, 0.0000 )
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] ( 1.4037, 1.3601, 0.8945, 0.9977, 0.1927, 0.0000 )
eig(A) ( 0.6256, 0.5516, 0.3213, 0.4484, 0.0000, 0.0000 )
Fiba Europe ( 9.0000, 9.0000, 8.0000, 8.0000, 6.0000, 5.0000 )
Table 2: Accessibility measures of the teams in competition digraph D
The classical solution for the problem of establishing a ranking among the nodes of an
oriented network modeled by means of a digraph D requires matrix A = (aij), where aij
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takes value 1 if (j, i) belongs to digraph D and value 0 otherwise. The solution is obtained
according to the idea due to Wei [20] and Kendall [11], where the ranking among the nodes
is based on the eigenvector of matrix A whose components are all positive.
For comparison, all six rankings are normalized in percentage vectors and presented
in Table 3.
percentage vector
a[D; v2, β˜] ( 27.08, 26.23, 18.09, 24.01, 4.60, 0.00 )
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] ( 26.89, 26.06, 18.17, 24.10, 4.78, 0.00 )
a[D; v2, β˜] ( 29.01, 28.46, 18.26, 20.68, 3.59, 0.00 )
a[D; v2, ψ˜1/3] ( 28.95, 28.05, 18.45, 20.58, 3.97, 0.00 )
eig(A) ( 32.13, 28.33, 16.50, 23.03, 0.00, 0.00 )
Fiba Europe ( 20.00, 20.00, 17.78, 17.78, 13.33, 11.11 )
Table 3: Normalized rankings for the teams in competition digraph D
(iv) A digraph competition with 6 teams allows us a total of 15 paired comparisons
among them. In our comment we will pay special attention to the pairs of teams they
obtain a same outcome made in the official classification.
Teams 1 and 2 are not structurally comparable in competition digraph D. Then, we
compare vectors of marginal contributions. For test game v2,
m1(v
D
2 ) = (0, 12, 64, 210, 430, 432) ≥ (0, 12, 62, 202, 416, 420) = m2(v
D
2 ),
so that the ranking will be favorable to team 1 according to game v2 and all semivalues,
as one can be seen in rows 1 and 2 of Table 2. Nevertheless, for test game v2, the vectors
of marginal contributions are not comparable:
m1(v
D
2
) = (0, 4, 24, 90, 200, 208), m2(v
D
2
) = (0, 4, 23, 85, 194, 210).
In despite, according to both selected semivalues, team 1 also exceeds team 2 (rows 3
and 4). Note that only the last component of vector m2(v
D
2
) takes a greater value than
the corresponding one of vector m1(v
D
2
). Selected semivalues β˜ and ψ˜1/3 are not able to
change the ranking among teams 1 and 2. It is easy to see that a semivalue with almost
all weight in the last weighting coefficient may be able to change the ranking among both
teams.
On the other hand, teams 3 and 4 are structurally comparable according to competition
digraph D, since there exists pi permutation of N with D4 ] ⊃ pi(D3 ]). In this case, by
Proposition 4.10, a4[D; v, ψ] ≥ a3[D; v, ψ] for every test game v and every semivalue ψ
defined on GN . Table 2 shows this inequality for the selected games and semivalues, where
each row specifies a ratio for the accessibility measures among teams 3 and 4, based on
each selected pair of test game and semivalue.
In competition digraph D, can not be found an eigenvector with all positive entries
for the corresponding matrix A. We have selected, for comparison, an eigenvector eig(A)
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with no negative entries. For teams 1 to 4, the ranking based on the eigenvector method
coincides in all studied cases with our method based on test games and semivalues. Also,
our null player, team 6, obtains in all cases value 0, including null entry of the considered
eigenvector. Since team 5 is not a null player according to our development, its accessibility
measures are strictly positive, whereas the eigenvector assigns null value to him. The
eigenvector method offers to each node an allocation proportional to the sum of allocations
to the nodes that link to him; in digraph D, only node 6 links to node 5 and then, the
null allocation assigned to team 6 also induces null allocation to team 5.
8. Concluding remark
Using techniques of Game Theory, the development of this work allows us to offer
several accessibility measures to the nodes of directed graphs. The main tool has been
the cooperative games in generalized characteristic function form, since the treatment
of oriented paths in digraphs requires to consider ordered coalitions. The method of
obtaining accessibility measures is based on the choice of a pair consisting of a cooperative
game, so-called test game, and a solution for cooperative games selected from the wide
family of semivalues. All obtained measures for the nodes can be considered as exogenous
procedures to compute accessibility in a digraph. In this way, our method allows us to
emphasize some types of structural characteristics in the digraph and measure the position
of its nodes according to them.
The main part of the paper has been devoted to desirable properties so that a game
can be considered as a test game; it must be symmetric, zero-normalized, monotonic,
convex. In addition, it is also considered the selection process for semivalues, according
to desired criteria for their weighting coefficients. For each digraph, the present work
offers a family of rankings for the accessibility of their nodes. If a node presents a better
structurally position than another, all rakings allocate a more accessibility to the node in
better position, but each selection of test game–semivalue modulates the ratio of allocation
according to the characteristics of the selected pair. It is particularly interesting the case
in which nodes are not structurally comparable in the digraph. Now, the pair formed by
test game and semivalue is able to detect this situation, offering different rankings that
depend on the features collected by the selected pair.
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